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Using Western Water Management Tools and Techniques in China
 Daniel P. Sheer
 President, Water Resources Management, Inc.
This paper tells the story of the Yellow River Basin
Water Resources Economic Modeling Study
(YRBWREMS).  It focuses on the ways in which Water
Resources Management, Inc. (WRMI) overcame
cultural and communications barriers in developing
new tools for the Yellow River Conservancy
Commission (YRCC). 
Economics, Multiple Objectives and Chinese
Culture
 
Water Resources Management Inc.'s involvement
in the YRBWREMS started in 1989, with a visit to the
PRC, and continued to 1994.   While we were invited
to bid on the project, the visit was largely speculative.
The request for proposals was clearly directed at
developing an economic input/output model of the
Yellow River Basin, and economic models are not
WRMI's speciality.   WRMI specializes in the
development of operations models for multi-objective
water management.
 
During the visit, we stressed that market driven
allocations of water are very unusual anywhere in the
world, including the U.S.   We felt they would be
particularly unlikely in the PRC, and even less likely in
the Yellow River Basin, where allocations of water to
the semi- autonomous regions in the basin are as much
(or more) a matter of political stability than of
economic development.  We argued that the most
beneficial use of analytical tools would be to
demonstrate the direct economic costs and benefits of
alternative, implementable, command and control
allocation policies.  This information could then be
used as a factor in designing such policies.  Clearly, it
would not be the only factor.  We also suggested that
displays of other direct objectives (e.g. grain production
by region, municipal and industrial water deliveries
and shortages) would be of very useful in deciding
among allocation policies.  As the result of our trip and
their proposal Water Resources Management, Inc. was
indeed selected as the consultant for the Yellow River
Water Resources Economic Modeling Study.   
 WRMI’s background in resolving multi-objective
multi-party disputes has demonstrated time and again
that understanding the culture and values of the client
are extremely important in helping them solves
complex water management problems.  As a result,
substantial time was spent on reading cultural
background material prior to the trip to China. 
Cultural material that was studied included more on
business practices and what would be expected at
cultural events than on actual practice of water
management in China.  This turned out to be very
important.  One of the major factors the Chinese were
looking for, in deciding upon a consultant, was a
feeling that they could work with the foreigners.  The
simple knowledge of when to make a toast and what to
say at a banquet were extremely important in showing
that cooperation was possible.  
      
It was clear from the beginning that translation
and working across languages, cultures, and time zones
would be a challenge.  As was recommended in the
materials that we studied in preparation for the trip, it
was very important to be relaxed and responsive to the
Chinese questions.  Sometimes those questions seemed
to have little to do with the topic being discussed.  Most
often this was due not to a lack of understanding but to
difficulties in communications, as the Chinese are fond
of saying. It seems to be very difficult to translate
Chinese word for word into a western language.
Differences in natural word order, grammar, tenses and
an underlying cultural point of view tend to make word
for word translations unintelligible.  We were prepared
for this.  In working with the translators, we would try
to present things in a way that required frequent
responses.  When the responses seemed not to make
sense, we would point out that we did not understand
the response and then try to rephrase our previous
ideas.  It could take four or five passes before the
proper ideas were communicated between the sides.  
 
In some cases, differences in cultural expectations
were the root of the problem.  This was most likely
when what we were discussing depended on
interpersonal interactions, such as Chinese seeking
help or information from other Chinese, or with inter-
or intra-agency procedures.  It also happened when
discussions assumed knowledge of a wide variety of
disciplines, as training in China is different and often
more narrowly focussed than training in the U.S.  In
such cases it was necessary to stop the conversation and
33
backtrack until the cause of the disconnect was
identified.  As a result, communications were very time
consuming and required a great deal of patience.
Success was very rewarding on a personal level.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, face to face
meetings took three to four times longer to accomplish
the same objectives as they would in the U.S.
Objectives of the Study
As is true with almost any effort to analyze a water
problem, there were multiple objectives among the
participants in the YRBWREMS.  The major
participants were the YRCC and, the World Bank.  All
had different objectives, and the following discussion
should shed some light on how the study was
performed.  The primary YRCC objective was to build
a working computer model of the Yellow River.  That
model was to allow them to evaluate the implications
in various management strategies for the river.  The
Chinese had a secondary objective of technology
transfer.  They wanted to learn to use modeling
technology on other river basins in China.  The World
Bank had quite a different objective.  The World Bank
wanted a tool that would allow them to do traditional
economic analysis of proposed projects on the Yellow
River.  Evaluation of strictly economic impacts using
input/output analysis, as opposed to the broader-based
social, economic and environmental impacts that were
of interest to the Chinese, caused a friction between the
two parties from the beginning.  Fortunately for Water
Resources Management, we were selected and hired by
the Chinese.  While it pleased our Chinese clients to
provide the World Bank with tools, it was clear to us
that our first priority needed to be to the Chinese
objectives.  
 
WRMI believed that the most lasting value from
the project would be in the training that could be
delivered to the Chinese working on the project.  As a
result, the entire work plan and schedule was designed
to have maximum involvement of Chinese staff at
every step of the way, with the American consultants
serving primarily as supervisors and advisors.  Delivery
of the product, a working model, was clearly a bottom
line for the project.  However, WRMI and our Chinese
clients agreed early on that the product would be
primarily a Chinese product.  Clearly without the full
cooperation and active and continuous participation of
the Chinese staff, no product could have been
developed.  Taking this approach was clearly a risk for
WRMI.  We were contractually obligated to provide the
model.  To some degree, our desire to do an interesting
and worthwhile project overrode our contractual good
sense.  
 
Contract Negotiations
The contract negotiations were unlike any contract
negotiations that the author has been involved in the
United States or elsewhere.  Both sides knew going in
what the budget was and both sides fully expected that
it would be completely exhausted. A reasonable
formula for setting the billing rates for all parties was
easily agreed upon.  As a result, the contract
negotiations  were mainly about how to structure the
work to get the most benefit for the Chinese from the
dollars that were to be spent.  Since WRMI s objective
was to provide training, and because this fit nicely with
the Chinese objective of technical transfer, it was clear
that most of the work would be done in China.  But,
this stipulation never made it into the formal contract;
it was handled almost entirely by a gentleman s
agreement.  
The Chinese had little experience with computer
hardware and software.  We at WRMI believed that the
best way to provide technology transfer was to bring in
a large number of relatively inexpensively, state of the
art, personal computers.  However, there were many
Chinese experts (called collectively the "mother's in
law" by our clients)  who doubted the ability of such
computers to perform the required calculations.  The
Chinese insisted that approximately 40 percent of what
turned out to be the computer budget was to be spent on
a UNIX-based workstation.  In the end, the workstation
provided almost no support for the project.  It did,
however, increase the perception of the project stature
among other Chinese and it increased the stature of the
department doing the project in the eyes of the
remaining departments in the Yellow River
Conservancy Commission.  While the author believes
that the workstation was of little value from a technical
standpoint, it may in fact have had a salutary impact on
the overall success of the project.  
 
The contract negotiations turned into an activity
designed to produce an acceptable and effective work
plan for the overall project, no more, no less.  The
author, sole representative of WRMI, and about
twenty-five Chinese worked for two days to prepare the
budget and labor estimates.  These were produced - on
the fly - using the author s portable computer.  At the
conclusion of the negotiations, the chief representative
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of the Ministry of Water Resources, who was fluent in
English, rose and exclaimed   Ho, I am exhausted.  
The author replied,  You're exhausted?  There were
twenty-five of you and only one of me.   Yes,  he said,
but you had the computer.  
Staffing
At the end of the negotiations, the Chinese had
committed to provide a staff of eighty professionals.
The American staff would be about twelve.  The work
would be done almost exclusively in China and the
Americans would use students from the University of
Texas, LBJ School of Public Affairs, carry-on some of
the training and some of the work in use of personal
computers.  The Chinese were to be almost exclusively
responsible for providing the data.  The American staff
was ultimately responsible for all the coding and
provision of the models but was committed to having as
much of the programming done by the Chinese as
possible.  American specialists were to be brought in to
give short courses to the Chinese on the theory
underlying the techniques they were implementing in
code.  Production runs of the model were to be done
and evaluated by the Chinese.  The arrangement for the
evaluations to be done by the Chinese served two
objectives.  The first, of course, was training.  The
second, was simply to keep the Chinese evaluation of
their own alternatives private among the Chinese.  This
turned out to be the first manifestation of the largest
single problem in performing the project, at least from
WRMI s point of view.  That problem was the
reluctance of Chinese, in general, to share data among
themselves or with foreigners.  
 
The Chinese staff was exceptionally well trained.
We found them to be bright, energetic, and very hard
working.  Our observation was that the thing that most
distinguished them from the American trained
counterparts was the narrowness of their training in
specific disciplines.  The American students who came
to China to assist with the project had a much more
shallow knowledge of the technical information and
concepts that underlay the analysis than did their
Chinese counterparts.  But because the Americans
understood more of the aspects of the entire problem,
they were much better able to visualize the entire work
effort. 
 
One of the most fortuitous decisions of the entire
project was the Chinese decision to assign bilingual
Chinese to work with the Americans.  These Chinese
were quite fluent in English, and particularly in
technical terms.  Their ability to deal with the technical
aspects of translation exceeded that of the best
translation staff assigned to the project, and was
absolutely vital.  For most of the effort in China, the
Americans could work directly with their Chinese
counterparts without the aid of a translator.  It is
impossible to understate the importance of that
assignment of bilingual Chinese to the success of the
project.  
 
Another unique aspect of the staffing of the project
was the use of the University of Texas LBJ Public
Affairs School students for carrying out a good deal of
the training in software and some of the grunt work to
be done by the Americans in China. This was
important on three counts.  First, students were an
inexpensive source of labor for the project.  Second, the
students from the University of Texas learned an
enormous amount about working on international
projects and the skills of their Chinese counterparts.
Third, and very important, because of the lower stature
of the students, as opposed to that of the (mostly Ph.D.)
professionals on the American side, the students were
not treated as formally as the professionals.  This
meant they had much easier assess to the lower levels
of the Chinese staff, the very people we were trying to
train.  WRMI made no profit on the student’s work,
but from the standpoint of the success of the overall
project and the satisfaction of the client, the students
were a tremendous asset.  
 
Beginning the Project
It was apparent at the beginning of the project that
overcoming the formality of communications between
the Chinese and Americans was going to be crucial to
completing the work in a cooperative manner.  Our
objective at WRMI was to bring our Chinese
counterparts up to speed immediately in the areas of
programming sophisticated water resources simulation
models on IBM 486 PC level machines.  While most of
the Chinese staff knew Fortran, none had any real
experience with modern programming tools, editors,
debuggers and programming environments.
Simplifying and stereotyping the American style of
learning such tools is simply to start, dive right in and
ask your colleagues lots of questions.  This is not the
Chinese style.  The Chinese style, again, stereotyping
and simplifying, is to delve deeply into the manuals
and figure everything out for yourself.   Asking for help
involves something of a loss of face.  This, coupled
with the formality of the communications between the
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Americans and the Chinese, made it extraordinarily
difficult to bring them up to speed.  
 
A way had to be found to "break the ice."
Americans began teaching the Chinese, not formally,
but by having them watch.  That is, the Americans
would sit at the computers and the Chinese would stand
behind watching what happened on the screen.  When
one of the Chinese students would see a typographical
error that was causing extreme pain in compiling the
program, he would point it out.  This was
complimented profusely, giving face to the student.
The reaction of complimenting the student was
un-Chinese; in China any correction of the professor’s
work is seen as a great loss of face for the professor.
We did our best by our reactions to make it clear that
we did not consider this to be a loss of face for
ourselves.  Our Chinese students were very bright and
soon their comments progressed from typos to logical
errors.  Programming in a fish bowl, as we were doing,
is difficult, but it was certainly helping our students
learn.  
 
After several multi-hour sessions of this kind of
teaching and learning, the Americans turned to the
Chinese students and said,  sit down.  Now you do it. 
The Chinese reaction was absolute terror, judging by
facial reaction.  But the poor student, now also a friend,
was in a position where he could not refuse.  The
student, of course, made mistakes.  But, our reactions
to those mistakes were always positive, always giving
face to the students.  It soon became clear that we
thought it was perfectly acceptable to ask questions and
take advice.  From then on, the training proceeded very
quickly, mostly American style.  Within a month the
Chinese had programmed, largely on their own,
prototype simulation models which used network
algorithms as "drivers."  We had overcome a great
"difficulty" in communications.  The Chinese managers
of the project were most impressed with the progress of
their own employees.  
Bridging the communications gap with the
Chinese managers of the project was equally difficult.
It also required the establishment of social interaction.
Clumsy attempts at learning the language provided a
perfect opportunity.  As project manager on the
American side, the author decided to use the language
as much as possible (in fact more than was possible).
With the difficulties of tone and lack of common
words, certainly many of the things said seemed quite
silly in Chinese.  But while silliness provoked laugher,
there was a great appreciation of the effort to learn the
language.  Mistakes provided the Chinese with an
opportunity to help (and supervise) the foreigners.
This "leveled the playing field," at least in some sense,
and greatly increased our feelings of cooperation.  The
cooperative spirit was very important to our Chinese
counterparts.
 
The Problem of Data
In all regards, obtaining the requisite data was the
most difficult part of the project.   First,  the realities of
survival in the Communist system promotes the
keeping of the two (and sometimes more) sets of books
for technical as well as financial data.  One set of books
is designed to demonstrate how efficient production
had been.  The second was designed to support the
requests for additional resources.  Not surprisingly the
data in each set of books was different.  It was
impossible to determine which, if either, better
represented physical reality.  
 
Second,  in China that data is power.  Most people,
professionals included, are quite reluctant to part with
data which they control.  Sometimes they are willing to
sell the data.  But, buying data requires paying two
prices.  There is, of course, the monetary cost, which is
usually modest.  But in addition, there is "guanxi." 
The act of giving up the data, even if it is purchased, is
seen as granting a favor.  And in China, favors
(guanxi) must be repaid.  While our project could have
paid the financial price for the data, data is widely
distributed in China.  The number and size of the social
repayments necessary made it impossible for our clients
to obtain much of the data we could have used.   The
problem with data extended from social and economic
data to simple hydrologic data, and was compounded
by a general reticence to make any data available to
foreigners.   In the end we wound up synthesizing
records which did, in fact, exist and which would have
been readily available in the United States. 
 
Choosing the Underlying Methods
The problem of choosing the science base for the
models was much less difficult than the problem of
obtaining data.  The hydrologic models were based on
simple mass balance using monthly time steps.  A
network algorithm was used to match flows and
demands.  A number of techniques were available to
model agricultural production, and our clients (who
were not agriculturalists) displayed no strong
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preference.  We were concerned, and properly so, that
the agricultural models reflect Chinese data since the
agricultural models were empirically based.  We did
our best to fit the limited Chinese agricultural data
made available to us.  
 
Economic evaluations in the models were based on
world commodity prices for the grains and other
products.  No attempt was made to use input/output
type methodology to estimate economic effects. The
author believes this was appropriate given that water is
allocated in command and control fashion in China
(and virtually every where else in the world, for that
matter).  Moreover,  most of the economic inputs
required for agricultural production in China are also
distributed on more or less command and control basis.
Our assumptions coincided nicely with our Chinese
counterpart’s interpretation of the way agriculture and
water allocation worked in China.   Therefore, we used
water as the sole determinant of changes in yield in
evaluating alternative policies.  Hydropower was
evaluated as the cost of replacement power from coal
fired generation.  
 
Importantly, no economic value was assigned to
urban and industrial water uses.  Instead, projected
urban and industrial demands were given absolute
priority over agricultural deliveries.  These
assumptions clearly reflect our Chinese counterpart’s
view of the way water is allocated.  They believe that
water in urban use in China will always have a higher
value than it will in agriculture.  And, within the range
of alternatives likely to be evaluated using the models
developed for the YRCC, this is probably correct.
Unfortunately, these assumptions are very much at
odds with those preferred by World Bank, the provider
of the credit, which funded the project.  When it
became apparent that input/output analysis would not
be used, the World Bank began a parallel development
of a set of input/output models for determining
economic values of water.  These will be discussed
later.  
 
Sediment is a serious problem in the Yellow River
(a gross understatement for a river that can flow 60%
by weight solids in flood).  However,  we were not
allowed to model the movement of sediment in the
river.  This was because the Chinese believed (with
good reason) that they were the world’s experts on
sediment flow in the Yellow River.  Our numerous
suggestions that functions describing sediment
transport be explicitly included in the model were
politely yet firmly refused.
 
Methods Reports 
At the end of the project s first year, a series of
reports on the methods to be used and incorporated in
the final production models were issued.  These reports
had two different objectives.  The first was to document
the progress to date.  They described the prototype
models which had been running and refined since
about the first month of the project.  They also
documented the training that had been done.  Most
important from the American side was that they
documented the responsibilities of the
Chinese to provide the data that would be necessary to
complete the project based upon and agreed upon set of
methods.  These reports were the first large salvo in a
continuing battle to get the data required to finish the
project.  
 
By that time the American had allies in the battle,
the students who had been trained on computers.  They
began to understand and grasp the overall complexity
of the project and the entire scope of what needed to be
done.  They had learned this from the American
professional staff and just as importantly from the
American students who were working shoulder to
shoulder with them.  It was becoming clear to the
Chinese in the computer lab that without the
appropriate data the project simply would fall apart.
On their own initiative, they began the difficult task of
convincing their Chinese counterparts that it was
essential that data be made available.  On the American
side, we were becoming confident enough in the
abilities of the Chinese we had trained to delegate the
task of evaluation, so that the foreigners did not have to
see all the data or all of the results.  This had the effect
of removing at least one of the barriers to transferring
the data: the reluctance to give such data to foreigners.
 
By the end of the first year, a personal computer
lab worthy of any university had been installed in the
project offices.  American students and Chinese
professionals were working shoulder to shoulder.
American professionals were directing the students and
English proficient Chinese and doing their best to
manage the project cooperatively with their Chinese
counterparts.  Interestingly there was no network in the
computer lab despite efforts on the part of the
Americans to have one brought in and  installed.  Some
of the Americans saw this as a simple extension of the
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Chinese proclivity not to share data.  
 
When Are We Done?
In the long run, waiting for the data ate up a large
portion of the project budget.  The American side
scheduled trips to China on the assumption that data
would be available.  When it was not, much time effort
and travel monies were spent with less than optimum
results.  Eventually, the decision had to be taken to use
whatever was currently available for calibrating the
models and to use that in the final reports.  Moreover,
by that time, the Chinese were comfortable enough
with the models, confident enough in their abilities and
reticent enough about sharing data to want to do the
final evaluations of alternatives outside of the view of
foreigners (and anyone else for that matter).  For the
Americans this was both encouraging and
disappointing. Disappointing because we never got to
use the models we had worked so hard to develop.
Encouraging because we knew that our Chinese friends
were by then fully capable of carrying out the work
themselves.  
 
At about the same time as the projects final reports
were being written and issued the results of the World
Bank’s input/output modeling efforts were becoming
available.  The YRCC models, included more than two
hundred separate inflow and withdrawal points.  The
Bank's models included only nine points, one for each
province along the river.  Both models operated the
major reservoirs.  The Bank’s  models were
input/output models assuming economic values and
pricing for production for all of the commodities.  The
YRCC model allocated water under command and
control strategies and was capable of testing the impact
of different command and control strategies on
economic output project models were based initially on
historical command and control allocations and could
match historical flows in the rivers within
fifteen-twenty percent at all points.  The Bank’s models
matched gross basin outflow equally well but
allocations to the individual provinces could be off by
as much as 75 percent or more.  Two sets of models
clearly demonstrate the difference in philosophy
between models grounded primarily on physical reality
and models based primarily on economic theory.
Clearly the Bank preferred the latter.  The YRCC (and
WRMI) prefer the former.  The author believes that a
lively debate over the merits of using either approach
for actually making management decisions about the
resources would be beneficial to all.
Conclusion
This short paper has focussed on the ways in
which WRMI overcame cultural and communications
barriers in developing new tools for the YRCC.  In
particular, we were fortunate in being assigned fluent
English speakers as primary trainees.  Their grasp of
technical language was most important, and minimized
the impacts of the language barrier.  In turn, they
provided the most effective possible training to other
Chinese.  Even with the reduced language barrier,
training styles needed to accommodate the Chinese.
Fortunately we were able to enable our students to
adopt a more Western, and we believe more rapid
(though probably less thorough) training technique.
Availability of good data is crucial to any analytical
work.  While we were able to make our clients
understand this necessity, we and they were unable to
fully overcome social and cultural obstacles to
obtaining full data sets within the time allotted.  The
ability of the Chinese to carry on the work, and to
evolve the models they helped develop can partially
mitigate this problem.  
 
In the final analysis, the project was most
successful in meeting the objectives of both WRMI  and
of the Chinese.  The Chinese obtained a full working
model of the river which they continue to use.  Because
the Chinese were heavily involved in model
development and programming, the model can
continue to evolve.  A number of reports were produced
to document the model
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 and the data that were used to develop it.  The goal of
transfer was obviously achieved.  A great deal of
training of American students also took place; the
experiences of working under difficult conditions on
real projects was most useful to the LBJ school
students.  A great deal of goodwill was generated, and
all participants gained an increased appreciation of the
social and cultural values.  As a result of the project, a
number of Chinese have come to the United States to
study as students.
 
Water management, and resource management
generally, must be suited to the physical reality and to
the social and cultural values of the specific geographic
area.  Traditional (monetary) economic values are but
one of the factors which must be considered, and often
not the primary factor.  Multi-objective analysis is
much more appropriate than standard (again monetary)
economic analysis in dealing with such problems.  The
water managers at the YRCC understood this, and
chose the form of their analytical tools accordingly.  
 
In working across cultures to develop management
tools, it is vital to understand the local values and to
incorporate them in the analysis.  Understanding local
values is not always easy, and understanding them is
very different from adopting them. In working across
cultures, there is a premium on developing ways to
communicate ideas clearly.  It is always appropriate for
those working in water management to use such
communications channels to inform their clients that
other value sets exist, and to explain them.  It is
generally not appropriate to impose those values on the
client's decisions.   
The consultant needs to understand the things his
client wants to achieve and to advise the client as to
other possible objectives.  The tools used should
demonstrate to the client alternative ways of achieving
economically and socially (including environmentally)
efficient mixes of those objectives. It is the client's job
to choose among efficient alternatives.  "Tell them
what they can do, don't tell them what they should do."
is the simple principle that helped steer the
YRBWREMS to success.
